Aristotelian nous joins impassibility to a capacity for receiving form

Evidence

But do these analogies permit the further deduction, of plasticity as the ‘genuine’ and ‘authentic’ character of νς? Wouldn’t the carefulness of Aristotle’s argument be invalidated by the violence of such a gesture, where a procedure that is no more than aporetic is transformed into the rigidity of a thesis? What is said on the subject of νς makes for a response to these questions extremely difficult. It must be the case, Aristotle insists, that ‘this part of the soul be, while impassible (/παθ0ς), is capable of receiving the form of an object (δεκτικν (…) τ ε1δυς) that it must be potentially identical in character with its object without being the object’. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 411

Categorization

Category: Definitional Content

• QUESTION: The reader’s core question — when does passive receptivity become explosive agency in the enemy figure — mirrors exactly this aporetic join of impassible receptivity to formative activity inside the noetic soul.

Related

• The noetic soul is paradoxically both impassible and receptive to form (similarity 0.86)
• Subjectivity needs a structure able to absorb alterity that the soul lacks initially (similarity 0.79)
• The intellect’s capacity to receive and give form originates its plasticity (similarity 0.79)