Subjectivity needs a structure able to absorb alterity that the soul lacks initially

Evidence

Subjectivity presupposes a primal synthesis of identity and difference: without this, differences could not be absorbed. Such a synthesis is indeed present as far as form is concerned: the ‘Self’ is already constituted. But this form lacks its own content. There must be a structure inherently capable of accepting alterity, and the soul is not and does not yet possess such a power. From this moment on, Hegel will proceed to intensify the dissociation between alterity and the self, forcing the consequences of this severance to their extremes. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 368

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to the reader’s core work on plasticity — the ‘structure capable of accepting alterity’ is precisely the plastic capacity the whole book tracks. — connects to: The diseased soul fails either to self-differentiate or to persist as identity — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 365