Anti-Catholic sentiment produced only a transitory Southern party switch, not a durable realignment.

Evidence

Figure 10 also shows that, unlike the Figure 5 analogue with black president, outside of 1961, anti-Catholic sentiment fails to predict Southern dealignment, suggesting that it cannot explain the longer-run trend. — Ilyana Kuziemko and Ebonya Washington, Why Did the Democrats Lose the South?…, 858

Categorization

• XREF: Supports the reader’s test question: threatened-privilege mobilization along one axis (religion) proved non-durable in the South, whereas along race it persisted — a useful discriminator for whether the mechanism generalizes. — connects to: Northern Catholic mobilization offset Kennedy’s Southern disadvantage — Ilyana Kuziemko and Ebonya Washington, Why Did the Democrats Lose the South?…, 821
• QUESTION: Why did race-based dealignment stick while Catholic-based didn’t — is it group size, threat saturability, or that racial hierarchy was institutionalized while Catholic identity threat was episodic?