Anguish is not paralysis but the necessary condition of responsible action.

Evidence

Who, then, can prove that I am the proper person to impose, by my own choice, my conception of man upon mankind? I shall never find any proof whatever; there will be no sign to convince me of it. If a voice speaks to me, it is still I myself who must decide whether the voice is or is not that of an angel. If I regard a certain course of action as good, it is only I who choose to say that it is good and not bad. There is nothing to show that I am Abraham: nevertheless I also am obliged at every instant to perform actions which are examples. Everything happens to every man as though the whole human race had its eyes fixed upon what he is doing and regulated its conduct accordingly. So every man ought to say, “Am I really a man who has the right to act in such a manner that humanity regulates itself by what I do.” If a man does not say that, he is dissembling his anguish. … Now it is anguish of that kind which existentialism describes, and moreover, as we shall see, makes explicit through direct responsibility towards other men who are concerned. Far from being a screen which could separate us from action, it is a condition of action itself. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism Is a Humanism, 12

Categorization

  • DEFINE: Clarifies the existentialist sense of ‘anguish’ as the felt weight of choosing for all humanity, distinct from ordinary fear or anxiety.
  • XREF: Connects to Beauvoir’s ethics of ambiguity and to Kierkegaard’s analysis of Abraham’s dilemma, which the Abraham reference deliberately invokes. — connects to: Anguish and responsibility are the felt consciousness of self-choice. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 1118; Pain can be an action itself, not merely a cause of action. — Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular:…, 333; Anguish is consciousness of being one’s own future in the mode of not-being — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 239 (+2 more)

Broader Connections