Academic economists’ private financial ties predict weaker calls for regulation

Evidence

Out of the nineteen academic economists chosen, thirteen had identifiable ties to some private financial firm, while eight served on boards of directors, and two were co-founders. When writing for the public (with the interesting partial exception of business advice proffered on Bloomberg), very rarely did any of these figures self-report their financial affiliations; rather, they did identify their affiliation with the NBER or the Fed. In academic papers published from January 2005 through October 2009, with one exception, the financial affiliations were never mentioned. They also noted ā€œthe stronger the economists’ alliance with the private sector the weaker would be their calls for regulation.ā€ — Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste, 2129

Categorization

  • XREF: Connects to Mirowski’s broader ā€˜thought collective’ thesis about economics as a profession—ties into the post-2008 economics reform literature and the revolving-door critiques. — connects to: Economists advising on financial reform mostly hid private industry affiliations — Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste, 577; Central bank funding blurs whose interests academic economists serve — Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste, 524; Patronage, not analysis, explains academic economists’ crisis positions. — Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste, 874 (+3 more)
  • SEED: Angle: empirical demonstration that discipline-level capture is measurable—the NBER/Fed identifiers as prestige ā€˜cover’ for private-sector financing.
  • DEEPTHINKING: This is a compact empirical demonstration of the thought-collective mechanism the book theorizes, not just an anecdote.

Broader Connections