The economist career conveyor belt into finance undermined the pretense of independent expertise

Evidence

Well before the census of these ranks was even partially populated, I expect my audience would have thrown in the towel. Charles Ferguson’s Inside Job has just scratched the surface of paid-but-not-quite-disclosed behavior by prominent economists; what is now needed is some comprehension of the aggregate systemic character of what has become a conventional career path. If you are lucky enough to write a few macrofinance papers that attract the attention of people that matter, and then garnish a plum political job such as under-assistant-subsecretary of the Treasury/Council of Advisors, touching the right political bases, then it just follows that you will in the fullness of time become absorbed into the corporate/financial sector in some reasonably lucrative capacity, and even perhaps later on become a regional Fed governor, all the while speaking out as an “independent” academic voice for the public commonweal. This career trajectory has been a conveyor belt for some time now, at least back to 1970, when Paul Samuelson helped found the hedge fund Commodities Corporation. The issue is not possible compromise of personal virtue of this or that individual in the face of tempting blandishments; it is rather that the proud pretense of “independent expertise” has become thoroughly undermined within the current economics profession. This has been the bane of academic economics, but also, after the crisis, the vessel of its deliverance. — Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste, 581

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to the ‘revolving door’ literature on regulatory capture and to the broader bibliographic thread on the profession’s incentives; resonates with the reader’s interest in how the thought collective co-opts critique. — connects to: Unpublished academic research directly founded an investment firm’s strategy — Donald MacKenzie, An Engine, Not a Camera: How Financial…, 437; Academic economists’ private financial ties predict weaker calls for regulation — Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste, 2129; Academic economists lent public trust to the TARP that Wall Street economists could not — Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste, 2276 (+6 more)
• SEED: Angle for an essay: the systemic, not individual, corruption of expertise — how a normal career path, not bad actors, hollows out independent academic voice.

Broader Connections

• Economists involved in financial innovation disappear their own roles when narrating crises #expands (0.80) — Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste, 571
• Career incentives lock economists into intellectually indefensible models they know are wrong #complicates (0.75) — Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste, 792