Abstract systems do not colonise the life-world but interact dialectically with it

Evidence

Does this mean that, as Habermas puts it, abstract systems “colonise” a pre-existing “life-world,” subordinating personal decisions to technical expertise? It does not. The reasons are twofold. One is that modern institutions do not just implant themselves into a “life-world,” the residues of which remain much the same as they always were. Changes in the nature of day-to-day life also affect the dis-embedding mechanisms, in a dialectical interplay. The second reason is that technical expertise is continuously reappropriated by lay agents as part of their routine dealings with abstract systems. — Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 347

Categorization

  • XREF: This challenges Luhmann’s stronger claim of total system self-reproduction; for Ishiguro, Stevens models the failure to reappropriate expertise — he never reskills, only defers. — connects to: Knowledge of the social world makes that world inherently unstable — Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 115; Traveling via abstract systems requires no technical mastery, only filtered lay knowledge — Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 268; Impersonal modern systems paradoxically enable reembedding of local personal life — Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 342 (+20 more)
  • QUESTION: Does Stevens’s total deference falsify Giddens’s claim that lay agents always reappropriate expertise, or simply show a pathological non-example?

Broader Connections