A single commander’s purge executed as many as three thousand Algerians

Evidence

Léger’s coup was a success that more than atoned for such past debacles as Oiseau Bleu, Kobus and even Bellounis. The destruction of the post-Yacef network in Algiers was so complete that, in effect, the Z.A.A. was never to be usefully re-created until the last months of the war. But even more far-reaching were the consequences of the mistrust it had sown in Wilaya 3. By what was more or less a random shot, Léger had struck at the Achilles’ heel of the whole F.L.N.: the mutual distrusts, hatreds and fears of betrayal that, as one now knows, seethed constantly just beneath the surface. Immediately Amirouche, like a Stalin in microcosm, launched the most savage and self-perpetuating series of purges. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 807 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

On top of the humiliation of defeat was compounded the confusion of not knowing what authority represented the true France. After 1940, while the French colonies in Equatorial Africa went over to de Gaulle, Algeria remained pro-Vichy; thus, within three years, Algerians found their loyalty invoked first to Pétain, then to Darlan, then Giraud and finally de Gaulle. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 119 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: The Algerian War killed about one million Muslims and expelled roughly a million settlers — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 9; French disinformation exploiting Algerian internal mistrust triggered murderous self-purges — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 807; European-led vigilante reprisals killed more Algerians after Sétif than army actions. (+2 more)

Broader Connections