A penal statute’s silence on a subject implies no legislative intent to regulate it

Evidence

Sge act of March 2, 1893, is a penal statute, and it changes the common law. It makes that unlawful which was innocent before its enactment, and imposes a penalty, recoverable by the government. Its terms are plain and free from doubt, and its meaning is clear. It declares that it is unlawful for a common carrier to use in interstate commerce a car which is not equipped with automatic couplers, and it omits to declare that it is illegal for a common carrier to use a locomotive that is not so equipped. As congress expressed in this statute no intention to forbid the use of Lcomotives which were not provided with automatic couplers, the legal presumption is that it had no such intention, and provisions to import such an intention into the law and to effectuate it may not be lawfully enacted by judicial construction. — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 1005

Categorization

• DEFINE: Illustrates the plain-meaning / expressio unius canon: what a penal statute omits, courts presume it did not intend.
• XREF: connects to: Penal statutes are strictly construed in favor of the accused — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 1055; No statute can be interpreted without attributing purpose to it. — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 880; Courts construe legislative silence as deliberate intent, though silence admits other readings — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 4205 (+3 more)

Broader Connections

• A legislature’s omission of a known exception signals deliberate intent to exclude it #contradicts (0.95) — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 1872
• Statutory silence on a question delegates discretion to the administrative agency. #contradicts (0.90) — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 898
• Courts construe legislative silence as deliberate intent, though silence admits other readings #qualifies (0.85) — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 4205