A mafioso’s protection siding depends on the parties’ bargaining positions

Evidence

Suppose only part of the population belongs to the cult in which “cross my heart” is (or is believed to be) absolutely binding. If everyone knows (and is known to know) everyone else’s affiliation, those belonging to this particular cult have the advantage. They can commit themselves, the others cannot. If the buyer says “16,000, cross my heart" his offer is final; if the seller says "19,000” he is (and is known to be) only “bargaining.” — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 72 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Mafiosi chose sides according to profit, not ideology or class loyalty; Protection terms depend on the relative power of customer and mafioso; Parties able to make binding commitments outbargain those who cannot — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 72

Related

• Parties able to make binding commitments outbargain those who cannot (similarity 0.83)

Broader Connections

• Parties able to make binding commitments outbargain those who cannot #complicates (0.72) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 72