A dominant party can accept a non-dominating order by recognizing shared vulnerability.

Evidence

Suppose we are starting from a position where one party dominates others. Is it really plausible that the strategy of constitutional provision could work here? Given the original difference of power, is not the dominating party going to believe that any inhibiting authority, no matter how it is elected or constituted, fails to track their particular interests, as they were served in the status quo ? … If the previously dominant party does believe this, then under a regime that is genuinely non-dominating, it has to be possible for them to voice their complaint and to contest the interference of the authority in their affairs. And if they are not satisfied with the judgement that the interference which inhibits them is not dominating, then it has to be possible for them to withdraw from the arrangement and encounter the authority, under a balance-of-power scenario, just as an agency for defending others against interference and for deterring interference by threatening and imposing punishment on interferers. Otherwise it is indeed the case that the arrangement, however well it serves the previously dominated parties, will not serve the interests of the previously dominant one: it will be a dominating form of interference from that agent’s point of view. … This concession need not worry us at this stage, since we are merely illustrating ways in which domination can be reduced and perhaps eliminated. But it is worth remarking that actually it is not entirely outlandish to think that the previously dominant party might accept the constitutional arrangement. After all that arrangement is going to be justified in response to contestation by the claim that everyone is capable of becoming vulnerable to others, and that they each have a common interest in being protected from others in a constitutionally assured manner. The stronger party can reject that claim only to the extent of believing that their current advantage is more or less assured and that they are not as other men and women. And that belief is hardly compelling, especially since henceforth the authority is going to protect others by all the defensive and deterrent means at its disposal. — Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 345

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to the reader’s research on solidarity formed via recognition of common weakness rather than out-group threat; echoes Pettitian contestation as the mechanism building consent. — connects to: Even power relationships involve reciprocal influence between parties — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 77; Non-domination confers security that survives others’ changed attitudes — Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and…, 350; Widespread mutual trust alone makes large-scale non-domination freedom possible — Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and…, 1300
• QUESTION: Empirically, do dominant parties ever actually accept shared-vulnerability frames, or does this require effective deterrence of the sort Pettit half-concedes?

Broader Connections

• Even power relationships involve reciprocal influence between parties #expands (0.80) — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 77
• Non-domination confers security that survives others’ changed attitudes #corroborates (0.75) — Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 350
• Widespread mutual trust alone makes large-scale non-domination freedom possible #corroborates (0.70) — Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 1300