A distinct literature studies how polities endogenously choose their own voting rules

Evidence

Related to the present paper is a recent literature on “choosing how to choose”, i.e. voting on voting rules. Aghion and Bolton (1997) introduce an incomplete contract methodology to analyze the normative choice of optimal majority rule. Maskin and Tirole (2001) provide a somewhat related discussion of government accountability. Barbera and Jackson (2001) investigate the endogenous choice of a majority voting rule, investigating conditions of existence of a self-stable voting rule, an issue that we will revisit below. — Philippe Aghion, Alberto Alesina, and Francesco Trebbi, Endogenous Political Institutions, 23

Categorization

• DEFINE: Defines the research program ‘choosing how to choose’ — voting on the voting rules themselves.
• SEED: Essay angle: the paradox of a democracy deciding by majority vote which decisions require a supermajority — who guards the guardians of the rules?
• XREF: connects to: Politicians deliberately shape who votes by steering policy to select their own electorate. — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 281