A dispositional spillover thesis needs psychological data, not correlational evidence.

Evidence

The third form of spillover argument is essentially about the creation of a disposition on which people then act even without direct reasoning in particular instances. This is roughly Oliver Williamson’s (1993) view, as discussed in chapter 3, that trust is not generally calculative. There is calculation or at least solid reasoning somewhere in the past but not in this moment when I am dealing with you. This raises the question of whether there is calculation when I first meet someone or whether my disposition is applied generally to virtually any and everyone, including those newly met and those never to be met again. To assess whether the dispositional (or spillover) thesis is correct would require psychological data that go beyond the correlations between measures over time of trust in government and participation in group activities. This is a fundamentally important issue on which we have inadequate knowledge. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 739

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to Hardin’s core claim that trust is encapsulated interest and calculative, contrasting with Williamson’s non-calculative dispositional view. — connects to: Meta-analytic reviews must exclude regression-only studies because effect sizes require zero-order correlations — Blake M. Riek, Eric W. Mania, and Samuel L. Gaertner, Intergroup Threat and Outgroup…, 77
• QUESTION: Worth chasing: what psychological data would actually test whether trust dispositions generalize beyond targeted assessment of trustworthiness?