A concept’s definition must match the mechanism its causal theory posits

Evidence

For example, I shall analyze the democratic and liberal peace in chapter 5. The basic hypothesis is that democracies do not fight wars. Causal mechanisms by which democracies do not fight wars involve attributes of democracy, for example, the ability to replace leaders via election. How we conceptualize democracy must be consistent with the causal mechanisms of theories that use the democracy concept. Because the constituent parts of the concept play a role in causal hypotheses, my approach to concepts is a realist one. One cannot neatly separate the ontology of a concept from the role it plays in causal theories and explanations. — Gary Goertz, Social Science Concepts, 196

Categorization

  • SEED: Angle: “Your definition is your theory” — why every operationalization of democracy smuggles in a causal mechanism, and what happens to the democratic-peace literature when the two are pried apart.
  • DEEPTHINKING: The realist claim that ontology and causal role cannot be separated undercuts the standard social-science division of labor between conceptualization and hypothesis testing.