Adrian Vermeule — Absolute Voting Rules
Yield
6 of 1180 paragraphs kept (0.5%).
Pre-Assessment
Adrian Vermeule is a Harvard Law School professor known for work on administrative law, constitutional theory, and institutional design; he wrote books including “Mechanisms of Democracy” (2007) and “Law’s Abnegation” (2016), and later became associated with a “common good constitutionalism” approach. I don’t recall a book titled “Absolute Voting Rules” — it may be a misremembered or misattributed title, possibly overlapping with his writing on absolute rules in constitutional/administrative law, or (unverified) something else entirely. Absent a stated reading stance, his work typically yields mostly concepts/frameworks — theoretical arguments about rules, institutions, and decision procedures — with some factual anchoring in law and political science, and a normative/inspirational layer given his explicit ideological commitments. If your goal is practical election mechanics or empirical voting behavior, the yield may be lower than expected.
Thesis
A voting rule is incoherent until it specifies both multiplier and multiplicand. · ch. 0
Argument
- Under a present-and-voting rule, mass abstention lets a tiny minority pass a bill. — ch. 1
- Quorum rules assume a legislative fraction statistically resembles the whole. — ch. 1
- Rules for rehearing en banc merely set the judicial agenda — ch. 2
- Rotating majorities make temporary usurpation self-defeating and therefore rare. — ch. 3
- Absolute majority rules strengthen opponents by making nonparticipation count against proposals. — ch. 9
Annotation Roundup
Define
- A voting rule is incoherent until it specifies both multiplier and multiplicand. — Introduces the multiplier/multiplicand distinction that makes ‘majority rule’ an incomplete specification rather than a fixed rule.
- Quorum rules assume a legislative fraction statistically resembles the whole. — Explains the implicit statistical premise justifying quorum minimums — the assumption that any part mirrors the whole.
- Rules for rehearing en banc merely set the judicial agenda — clarifies what an agenda-setting rule is versus a decision rule, a distinction with real doctrinal consequences.
- Absolute majority rules strengthen opponents by making nonparticipation count against proposals. — Frames absolute-majority rules as a device that transfers agenda power to opponents rather than merely raising a threshold.