Yet Professor Schauer argues that this aversion to formalism should be rethought: At times language both can and should restrict decisionmakers. Consequently, the term “formalistic” should not be used as a blanket condemnation of a decisionmaking process; instead the debate regarding decision according to rules should be confronted on its own terms.

Evidence

The vice known to legal theory as formalism or conceptualism consists in an attitude to verbally formulated rules which both seeks to disguise and to minimize the need for such choice, once the general rule has been laid down. One way of doing this is to freeze the meaning of the rule so that its general terms must have the same meaning in every case where its application is in question. — HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Law…, 370 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Formalism may be more broadly viewed as extending to any justification that treats as inexorable a choice that is not. In this broader sense, the claimed inexorability might come from something other than rule formulations. To mask, for example, a political, moral, or social choice in the language of “original intent” when original intent in fact does not provide a uniquely correct answer to the issue might be considered formalistic in the same way that masking a political, moral, or social choice in the language of the meaning of a rule is considered formalistic when that language does not provide a uniquely correct answer. Similarly, masking choice in the language of mathematical economic derivation or in the language of a unique solution to some “balance” might be considered formalistic if these methods are in fact comparatively indeterminate. — Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 34 (#qualifies, via linked claim)

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: Rules necessarily overreach their justifications because of their intrinsic generality — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 46; Defending the idealized version of a practice cannot guide real-world policy — , The Rod and the Child: A Global History…, 6473; Thus, one view of the vice of formalism takes that vice to be one of deception, either of oneself or of others. To disguise a choice in the language of definitional inexorability obscures that choice and thus obstructs questions of how it was made and whether it could have been made differently. Use of the word ‘formalism’ in this sense hinges on the existence of a term (or phrase, sentence, or paragraph) whose contested application generates the choice. Some terms, like ‘liberty’ and ‘equality,’ are pervasively indeterminate. It is not that such terms have no content whatsoever; it is that every application, every concretization, every instantiation requires the addition of supplementary premises to apply the general term to specific cases. Therefore, any application of that term that denies the choice made among various eligible supplementary premises is formalistic in this sense. (+11 more)

Broader Connections