Workers bias client selection toward the gratification of likely success, not just agency incentives.

Evidence

A third circumstance in which street-level bureaucrats regularly display biased behavior arises when they are able to act on the view that some clients are more likely to respond to treatment than others. This category of favoritism is similar to creaming except that the motivation comes not from the reward structure of the agency (although this may playa part) but from the gratification that comes with helping people who are thought likely to respond to help. — Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy, 813

Categorization

• XREF: Extends the creaming mechanism central to the book’s account of how reward structures shape discretion. — connects to: Workers under load select clients likely to succeed despite formal equity mandates. — Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of…, 788; Restructuring job incentives and stresses can change workers’ client attitudes — Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of…, 1050; Organizational reward structures tie agents’ interests to the organization, not clients

Broader Connections

• Organizational reward structures tie agents’ interests to the organization, not clients #complicates (0.90)
• Restructuring job incentives and stresses can change workers’ client attitudes #qualifies (0.85) — Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy, 1050