Willing one’s freedom and willing that being exist are one choice

Evidence

There is no way for a man to escape from this world. It is in this world that — avoiding the pitfalls we have just pointed out — he must realize himself morally. Freedom must project itself toward its own reality through a content whose value it establishes. An end is valid only by a return to the freedom which established it and which willed itself through this end. … It is not necessary for the subject to seek to be, but it must desire that there be being. To will oneself free and to will that there be being are one and the same choice, the choice that man makes of himself as a presence in the world. — Simone de Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity, 72

Categorization

• DEEPTHINKING: The core reformulation of freedom in this chapter: freedom is not the pursuit of being but the willing of being-presence, and this is declared identical to willing freedom — the crucial move the reader is tracking to see if it is derived or smuggled.
• QUESTION: The reader wants to test whether the identity claim here — ‘to will oneself free and to will that there be being are one’ — is actually derived or merely asserted.
• XREF: connects to: Freedom, choice, nihilation, and temporalization are one single act — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 1122; Freedom exists only as engaged, self-choosing action, never as undetermined potential — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 1145; Freedom chooses its being but cannot choose not to be — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 1146 (+3 more)