What befalls a person through others demands a side-taking that natural events do not

Evidence

Only man can be an enemy for man; only he can rob him of the meaning of his acts and his life because it also belongs only to him alone to confirm it in its existence, to recognize it in actual fact as a freedom. It is here that the Stoic distinction between “things which do not depend upon us” and those which “depend upon us” proves to be insufficient: for “we” is legion and not an individual; each one depends upon others, and what happens to me by means of others depends upon me as regards its meaning; one does not submit to a war or an occupation as he does to an earthquake: he must take sides for or against, and the foreign wills thereby become allied or hostile. — Simone de Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity, 86

Categorization

• XREF: Directly undermines the Stoic dichotomy Beauvoir elsewhere engages; connects to chapter 1’s treatment of choices and attitudes toward the given.
• QUESTION: Useful test case: does the non-reciprocal dependence — that I can be subject to others’ choices without their depending on mine — quietly solve the promised derivation of freedom?