Wartime labor-mobility restrictions functioned as wage caps against workers’ enhanced bargaining power.

Evidence

In Britain, section 7 of the Ministry of Munitions Act prevented workers from transferring freely from one job to another by requiring workmen to obtain a leaving certifi cate before engaging in alternative employment. Th is harsh provision had a twofold motive. First, the depletion of the reserve army of labor gave workers enhanced bargaining power, which forced employers to bid up wages in order to attract available labor, especially skilled labor. By imposing a political limit on such mobility, the government could ensure a cap on wages. Second, these certifi cates also prevented the constant turnover of labor, which hampered the production process. — Clara E. Mattei, The Capital Order, 176

Categorization

  • QUESTION: Worth chasing: the parallel between these World War I leaving certificates and modern anti-poaching/no-compete arrangements as tools to cap wages.
  • XREF: Resonates with the book’s linking of wartime planning to later austerity doctrines — this is a state wage-control mechanism predating the interwar austerity programs. — connects to: War-induced labor scarcity forced state intervention to discipline workers — Clara E. Mattei, Escape from Capitalism, 171; Postwar labor power drove real wages and wage shares to postwar highs. — Clara E. Mattei, The Capital Order: How Economists…, 1553; Wartime state wage controls kept wages lower than free bargaining would have — Clara E. Mattei, The Capital Order: How Economists…, 179 (+6 more)

Broader Connections