Voting may be irrational under expected-value calculus unless citizen’s duty supplies extra utility

Evidence

According to Downs (1957), it may not be rational for an individual to register and vote in large elections because of the very low probability that the individual would cast a decisive vote coupled with the costs of registering and going to the polls. Objections to Downs’s view were raised by Riker and Ordeshook (1968), who argued that an individual may derive from voting other benefits besides the possibility of casting a decisive ballot. These additional benefits are collectively referred to as citizen’s duty, or D, and they include affirming one’s allegiance to the democratic system, complying with a powerful ethic, participat-ing in a common social ritual, as well as “standing up and being counted.” To these rational consequences of voting, we suggest adding a somewhat less rational component. — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 2513 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Risky challengers win bad-time votes despite equal expected value. — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology: Key Readings, 2441; Voting’s low decisive-ballot probability makes it irrational absent citizen-duty benefits — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 2513

Broader Connections

• Voting’s low decisive-ballot probability makes it irrational absent citizen-duty benefits #expands (0.98) — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 2513