Voters can define ideology on wholly different dimensions, not opposite poles

Evidence

To begin with, those studies (Asher, 1980; Weisberg & Rusk, 1970) which posit the existence of two liberal/conservative dimensions raise a possibility which paradoxically conflicts with a dimensional interpretation of the meaning of ideological terms. Namely, for some voters, one dimension might be significantly more salient than the other in determining the meaning associated with such terms. Some people, for example, might define ideological labels almost exclusively in terms of social issues while, at the same time, others may base their interpretation entirely on economic issues. Were this to occur, different groups of people would have fundamentally different, rather than opposing or bipolar, ideological perspectives. — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 1991 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Voters can hold fundamentally different, not just opposite, ideological meanings — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 1991; Voter confusion about ideology stems from flawed dimensional assumptions, not ignorance; People label themselves ideologically via differing symbolic attachments, not a shared spectrum (+4 more)

Broader Connections

• Voters can hold fundamentally different, not just opposite, ideological meanings #expands (0.92) — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 1991