Voluntary climate pledges rely on reputation pressure, not sanctions, for compliance.

Evidence

The purpose of the 2014 summit in Lima, Peru, was to develop a framework for formalizing a global climate agreement in Paris in 2015. The members abandoned the ambitious goal of adopting a legally binding global climate accord in favor of a more modest voluntary one. Every country would pledge cuts in carbon emissions at an economically and politically feasible level (Davenport, 2014d). There are no sanctions for not submitting a plan to cut emissions or for violating the submitted ones. Compliance is based on “international scorn” (Davenport, 2014a). This frail climate accord is the product of almost two decades of summitry, during which time emissions of greenhouse gases have soared. — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 2939

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to the reputation-based informal enforcement mechanisms in Milgrom on the law merchant — here applied at global scale, with ‘international scorn’ as the sole sanction. — connects to: Neoliberal climate strategy treats ineffective measures as a feature, not a bug. — Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste, 936
• ADDENDUM: Relevant to the broader mechanism of cooperation without coercive enforcement explored in prior curated sources on reputation and trust.
• SHARE: The phrase ‘compliance is based on international scorn’ as the enforceable mechanism of the Paris framework is a striking single point for anyone tracking climate governance.