Violating identity-based moral loyalty is condemned far more harshly than violating practical consequences

Evidence

When such emotions become connected to cognitive constructs such as loyalty and fidelity to the group, cooperation can be especially hard to initiate. Loyalty to the in-group often takes on moralistic overtones, especially when they are linked to individuals’ sense of group identity (Barber, 1983; Brewer, 1981; Kramer, Pommerenke, & Newton, 1993). As March (1994) observed in this regard, “Decision makers can violate a logic of consequences and be considered stupid or naive, but if they violate the moral obligations of identity, they will be condemned as lacking in elementary virtue” (p. 65). — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 1975

Categorization

• XREF: The March logic-of-appropriateness quote connects to the reader’s honor/moral-signaling thread and to moral panic dynamics where identity violation outranks pragmatic judgment.
• SHARE: The March line is a striking, quote-ready observation about why loyalty failures (e.g., perceived betrayal of one’s group) draw moral condemnation in ways that practical mistakes never do.
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 1975