Vertical integration was once treated as evidence of monopolization intent in antitrust law

Evidence

To curtail concentration and monopolization, Levi put forward some policy recommendations, one of which included cracking down on vertical integration. “Usually in an integration case, however, the effort is made to use ownership of one part of an industry to dominate another part—at least that is what separates the integration case from the straight monopolization case” (Levi 1947, 180). Levi recommended: “Here an intent to monopolize may have to be found, and may well be only in a plan recognized as such because of restrictive arrangements, price cutting, or fraud—earmarks of the abuse category” (p. 180). In short, Levi maintained that vertical integration coupled with “abuses,” such as price-cutting, provided sufficient evidence of intent to monopolize, and hence constituted grounds for illegality. After the birth of neoliberalism, however, Levi would come to maintain the contrary proposition. — Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe (eds.), The Road from Mont Pèlerin, 1105

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to how the Chicago School’s later hostility to structural and abuse-based antitrust theses (Bork, Posner) represents a genuine reversal, not an original position. — connects to: Antitrust law’s presumptions cannot be isolated from prevailing economic theory — Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe (eds.), The Road from Mont Pèlerin: The Making…, 1146; Certainty-driven per se rules threatened antitrust’s common law flexibility — Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe (eds.), The Road from Mont Pèlerin: The Making…, 1138; Post-1911 antitrust law turned against ordinary practices without requiring monopoly size — Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe (eds.), The Road from Mont Pèlerin: The Making…, 1137

Broader Connections

• Antitrust law’s presumptions cannot be isolated from prevailing economic theory #expands (0.75) — Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe (eds.), The Road from Mont Pèlerin, 1146
• Certainty-driven per se rules threatened antitrust’s common law flexibility #responds-to (0.72) — Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe (eds.), The Road from Mont Pèlerin, 1138
• Post-1911 antitrust law turned against ordinary practices without requiring monopoly size #corroborates (0.72) — Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe (eds.), The Road from Mont Pèlerin, 1137