Value’s being consists precisely in not having being

Evidence

Value is affected with the double character, which moralists have very inadequately explained, of both being unconditionally and not being. Qua value indeed, value has being, but this normative existent does not have to be precisely as reality. Its being is to be value; that is, not-to-be being. Thus the being of value qua value is the being of what does not have being. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 367

Categorization

  • DEFINE: Defines the paradoxical ontology of value: its being is not-to-be being, the being of what does not have being.
  • XREF: Connects directly to the moralist paradox of normative existents, and points forward to Beauvoir’s Ethics of Ambiguity where value hovers between being and non-being. — connects to: Being is necessarily defined against what it is not — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 183; A value grounded in being would destroy value and enslave the will; Value is intuited only as a beyond of concrete acts (+6 more)

Broader Connections