Urban danger warnings need not be accurate to be rational

Evidence

It might be noted that the general accuracy of teachings such as this one is, in many respects, irrelevant. It might be, for example, that one could gather an equally impressive list of crimes in the same period for other areas of the city which are not thought to be dangerous. It might be that looked at more closely, the crimes here reported would turn out to be less ominous than the story suggests (for example, the violence largely occurred between people who knew one another). The point is, that when an area is designated dangerous, urbanites lose little by believing the designation and acting on the basis of it, that is, by avoiding the area. It simply doesn’t matter whether it is true or not. But, the opposite situation does not obtain. If an area is designated as safe or pleasant, or whatever, and it turns out not to be, then the individual who has acted on the basis of the designation and gone to the area may be in for an unpleasant, embarrassing, or even dangerous experience. As a general principle, then, one might say that for the city dweller, accentuating the negative is always the better pan of valor. — Lyn H. Lofland, World of Strangers_ Order and Action in…, 593

Categorization

• XREF: Directly speaks to how urbanites manage strangers and public space without firsthand knowledge — supports Lofland’s broader cognitive-economy argument that classification replaces interpersonal trust.