Unregulated trades generate territorial violence that private enforcers could resolve

Evidence

Polish immigrants cleaning windshields at traffic lights in Rome provide an instance of how an innocuous trade, when it is not regulated by law, can generate territorial disputes. In 1989 this business was lucrative: each man made between 100,000 and 300,000 lire a day, and, according to the Carabinieri, violent fights arose over the allocation of the most profitable intersections. The cleaners, who were unable to cooperate, attracted the attention of the authorities (Repubblica, August 2, 1989). Had private enforcement agencies been on hand as they are in Naples and Palermo, they might have been called in instead to prevent conflict. — Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia The Business of…, 522

Categorization

• XREF: Perfect natural-experiment evidence for the reader’s opening scene (Bonasera) — where state failure creates demand for private justice. Also echoes Milgrom’s point that one-shot, anonymous trades without institutions break into violence. — connects to: Private-judge trading systems succeed only when enforcement costs stay low — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 15
• SEED: The windshield-cleaner vignette is a crisp, self-contained anecdote for an essay on how the absence of law reliably conjures private enforcers.
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia The Business of…, 522

Broader Connections

• Private-judge trading systems succeed only when enforcement costs stay low #corroborates (0.80) — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 15