U.S. Psychological Operations bungled Somalia outreach by ignoring radio

Evidence

Messages inaccurately translated into Somali, purporting to advise the populace of the force’s good intentions, were dropped from helicopters over Mogadishu. These ham-fisted efforts, which Somali recipients derided, were orchestrated by the U.S. military’s Department of Psychological Operations (‘Psy. Ops’) and ignored the readily available information that the best way to establish dialogue with the Somali population was by radio! — I.M. Lewis, I. M. Lewis, A Modern History of the Somali_ Nation…, 897 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

At full strength, this unprecedented U.N. force by February 1993 included over 33,000 personnel, of whom over 28,000 were supplied by the United States. … Following the Pentagon’s original plan, the Americans’ principal objective was to deliver food and humanitarian supplies safely to the most needy areas of southern Somalia. With the proximity of Christmas, they were especially exercised to have as few casualties as possible and so proceeded cautiously and with deliberate, if sometimes poorly designed local publicity, on the assumption that their huge numbers and technical superiority would easily overwhelm the Somali population. — I.M. Lewis, I. M. Lewis, A Modern History of the Somali_ Nation…, 628 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: US psychological operations in Mogadishu failed by ignoring Somali radio culture — I.M. Lewis, I. M. Lewis, A Modern History of the Somali_ Nation…, 897; The government relied on radio because most Somalis could not read; The U.S. assumed its technical superiority would easily overwhelm the Somalis — I.M. Lewis, I. M. Lewis, A Modern History of the Somali_ Nation…, 628

Broader Connections