TSA terror databases hold about one hundred thousand to one million names

Evidence

One space where state-led surveillance of Muslim bodies is overwhelmingly obvious is in U.S. airports. Muslim experiences in airports reveal the interplay of technologies coupled with practices by state agents that rely on religious, ethnic, and gendered cues. TSA uses lists such as the Secondary Security Screening Selection List and the No-Fly List—derived from the FBI’s Terrorist Screening Database and the National Counterterrorism Center’s Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE)—to surveil Muslim passengers in airports. According to the TSA website, the No-Fly List contains approximately one hundred thousand names, while TIDE contains roughly one million names (Handeyside 2014). Passengers who find themselves on these lists either are prevented from flying (the No-Fly List) or have to endure several layers of additional security simply because they have Muslim names. The majority of the Muslim men I interviewed told me they were on some list at airports. The Muslim women I interviewed told me they were not on a TSA list like Muslim men, indicating that the state targets mostly men for surveillance through these terrorist databases. However, Muslim women who wear the hijab were subjected to profiling by TSA agents. The women I spoke to told me they were repeatedly stopped and had their bodies and personal belongings searched at the airport security line by TSA agents. — Saher Selod, Forever Suspect_ Racialized…, 56

Categorization

Category: Factual Claims

• XREF: Connects to Beydoun’s ‘American Islamophobia’ account of the No-Fly List and TIDE; also links to the Global Racial Enemy map slot.
• QUESTION: Why are women not placed on TSA lists while men overwhelmingly are — what mechanisms encode gender into the terror databases?

Related

• U.S. terrorist screening lists hold roughly 100,000 to one million names (similarity 0.92)
• Airport surveillance differentially targets men via lists and hijab-wearing women via physical searches (similarity 0.88)
• Muslim men are placed on TSA lists based on name similarity to suspected terrorists. (similarity 0.87)
• Named Muslim men on the Selectee List endure stacked layers of airport checks (similarity 0.86)
• Listed Muslim travelers are routinely pulled for pat-downs at airport checkpoints (similarity 0.85)
• Airport profiling targets Muslims as a religious class, not any specific nationality (similarity 0.84)
• TSA agents profile hijab-wearing Muslim women based on racial cues, not watchlists. (similarity 0.84)
• Airport profiling of Muslims is systemic and state-institutionalized rather than random (similarity 0.84)
• TSA surveillance targets citizens regardless of religiosity, profession, or travel habits (similarity 0.83)
• Gendered surveillance watches women for cultural transgression and men for terror. (similarity 0.83)
• Airports allocate the privilege of unexamined travel along racialized lines (similarity 0.83)
• The Selectee List turns airports into racialized surveillance terrain. (similarity 0.82)
• TSA Selectee List status subjects Muslim men to repeated layers of airport interrogation (similarity 0.82)
• Airport watchlist scrutiny falls primarily on Muslim men rather than women (similarity 0.81)
• Government watchlists target Muslim men for extra airport security (similarity 0.81)