Trusting someone does not entail acting on that trust

Evidence

Suppose my trusting you in some matter is rational in the sense of being well grounded. What follows? Perhaps nothing. That I trust you does not entail that I should act on the trust. There might be other things I would rather do at the moment or other people whom I similarly trust for the matter at hand. Therefore, I face a choice of what to do even though it is incoherent to say I choose to trust you. If I trust you, I will think it not very risky to rely on you in some matter. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 99

Categorization

• XREF: Distinguishing trust from reliance-on-action is precisely the analytical lever for the Saramago reading: the wife’s trust in the husband’s trustworthiness does not by itself mandate her protective actions.