Trust involves beliefs about the other’s incentives toward me, not mere expectations

Evidence

In the encapsulated-interest account of trust, the knowledge that makes my beliefs about you a matter of trust rather than of mere expectations is my beliefs about your incentives toward me in particular. These are not merely bald, unarticulated expectations about your behavior. I have bald expectations that the sun will rise tomorrow, and I might not be able to give any account of why I think that, other than induction from the past. (As a physicist, you might be able to give a very good account, so that your expectation of the sun’s rising is theoretically grounded.) What matters for trust is not merely my expectation that you will act in certain ways but also my belief that you have the relevant motivations to act in those ways, that you deliberately take my interests into account because they are mine. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 101

Categorization

• DEFINE: The ‘encapsulated interest’ definition — the load-bearing concept for the whole book and for distinguishing trust from mere expectations like the sun rising.
• XREF: Against Luhmann’s ‘familiarity’ (trust as taken-for-granted expectation), Hardin insists trust is specifically a belief about the other’s encapsulated incentives — the reader’s integration will hinge on exactly this contrast.