Trust guarantors deliberately withhold certification to remain scarce and powerful

Evidence

One might ask why the mafioso should not offer his ā€˜mark of guarantee’ to all sellers on the market and then let customers choose on the basis of taste, price, and the detectable quality of the goods. He would thus effectively offer trust as a public good: all sellers could chip in to pay him his due for making them appear trustworthy, and transactions would then take place in an ā€˜ordinary’ market. The available evidence suggests that this is not the case and that the mafioso tends to guarantee, and therefore to select, only a limited number of sellers at the expense of others. — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 2244

Categorization

  • XREF: Parallels controlled entry at the Champagne Fairs and DeBeers sight-holder scarcity — certifiers preserve value by limiting who gets certified.
  • SEED: Angle: scarcity of trust, not just of goods, is what makes markets work or fail — certification as deliberately rationed privilege.