Treating religion as mere doctrinal faith misses its social and therapeutic functions

Evidence

If properly approached, as Tempels tried to do, the insight myths give is profound, not superficial, and is a royal road to transcultural understanding. … I have argued that Oruka’s use of Wittgenstein is interesting and impressive, but Wittgenstein’s basic fallacy is that he considers religion to be an act of faith, a commitment to a truth claim, in the first place. In the second place, experience with African religion also shows Oruka’s interpretation of Wittgenstein and Quine to be wrong. Religion is not just limited to knowing doctrinal elements. Religion also helps in social identification with co-religionists, implying that it takes social and political dimensions. At the existential level, African religion, for example, is not just limited to faith but extends to therapeutic benefits and sociability in the community which this form of religion generates. — Frans Dokman, Beyond Bantu Philosophy_…, 567

Categorization

• XREF: Echoes the pragmatist critique (James/Dewey) that religion is lived practice, not propositional assent; connects to broader philosophical debate about whether outsiders can understand religious belief.