Treating power as relational redistributes agency toward the subordinated.

Evidence

Excessive strain on the power-holder in organizations can, in other words, always be exploited by others as their own source of power, if his position does not leave him with the pleasure of acting or not acting. One can not only withhold information from him and thus protect oneself from him, one can also count on his seeking consensus, because he relies on ‘co-operation’ and decisions about ‘free’ consensus or dissent. To the extent that this is the case in a bureaucratic context, a penultimate option, i.e. the possibility of getting one’s way through orders, makes itself available, before the final avoidance alternative of dismissal or resignation. This too contributes to power, if one keeps it in the background and uses it as little as possible. In order to avoid making explicit orders the superior then would prefer to drop relatively unimportant goals, while, on the other hand, subordinates skilfully avoid bringing him to a point where he needs to issue an order. — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 798 (#expands, via linked claim)

In the case of an action motivated by power, the selection, although carried out by both parties, tends to be attributed to the power-holder alone, because the power-subject does not appear to have motives which can be recognized as his own. Admittedly this does not have to be the case. For example, not every exercise of power frees the power-subject from criminal responsibility. A power-code, however, must take account of this tendency to shift attribution and can legalize and formalize it by giving the power-subject, for example, the possibility of being ‘officially’ compelled and thereby relieving himself of responsibility. In extremely power-specific codes, such as the military, this even occurs without the assistance of the subordinate; the officer takes responsibility for an unclear order. — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 686 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Power shifts attribution of actions from the subject to the power-holder; Power shifts blame from subordinate to power-holder by suppressing the subordinate’s own motives — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 686; Subordinate groups strategically deploy difference to resist dominant control and revalue themselves — David Theo Goldberg, John Solomos, A Companion to Racial and Ethnic Studies, 115 (+3 more)

Related

• A superior’s dependence on cooperation becomes exploitable leverage for subordinates (similarity 0.84)
• Power shifts blame from subordinate to power-holder by suppressing the subordinate’s own motives (similarity 0.83)
• Withholding cooperation becomes power under high interdependence (similarity 0.82)
• Organizations can differentiate power bases but not power’s subject matter, blocking negotiated balance. (similarity 0.79)
• Subordinate self-determination is read as a threat to dominant rule (similarity 0.79)
• Organizational decentralization reduces power to mere veto power that informal networks then compensate for. (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Power shifts attribution of actions from the subject to the power-holder #expands (0.85)
• A superior’s dependence on cooperation becomes exploitable leverage for subordinates #expands (0.82) — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 798
• Power shifts blame from subordinate to power-holder by suppressing the subordinate’s own motives #expands (0.80) — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 686
• Subordinate groups strategically deploy difference to resist dominant control and revalue themselves #expands (0.75) — David Theo Goldberg, John Solomos, A Companion to Racial and Ethnic Studies, 115
• Subordinates inflict harm on their own group with benevolence to succeed within dominant rules #expands (0.72) — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 683