Treason maintains equilibrium in segmentary societies as prices do in markets

Evidence

Just as luxury items such as yachts cost poor people more, and big weapons such as crab claws and antlers cost poor-quality males more, so, too, big-ticket weapons cost more to build in poor nations than they do in rich ones. An F-5 fighter costs more to produce in Spain or South Korea, for example, than it does in the United States, and still more for nations such as Ecuador. We can afford to mass-produce the planes in larger volumes, cutting the per-plane production cost enormously. We can afford to support a larger research and development program, giving us a head start on new innovations to fighter technology. We can afford to train a larger workforce skilled in the necessary technologies—everything from pilots to fly the plane to mechanics to repair it. All of these factors mean that rich nations pay an awful lot less per weapon for state-of-the-art things such as aircraft, submarines, missiles, and carriers than poorer nations do, exacerbating the differences between the haves and have-nots. — Emlen, Douglas J, Animal Weapons_ The Evolution of Battle, 924 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: A social equilibrium persists when agents lack incentives to change it; Weapon costs follow the same handicap economics in nations as in individuals — Emlen, Douglas J, Animal Weapons_ The Evolution of Battle, 924; Pervasive distrust is stable because solo cooperation invites exploitation (+2 more)

Broader Connections