Time-separated commitments cannot couple present and future motivations into a single net motivation

Evidence

Our problem in asserting our trustworthiness is similar to Alberich’s in asserting his disavowal of ever loving or lusting. When the time comes to live up to our assertions, we may face forcefully contrary motivations. Other things being equal, we might readily fulfill our commitment. Other things are often not at all equal, however. Once we already have whatever led us to our commitment in the first place, we may no longer find it in our interest to keep the commitment, even though, if we had been able to get our benefit and fulfill our commitment in a single moment, we might happily have done so. What we lose when receipt of the benefit and fulfillment of the commitment are separated in time is the coupling of the motivations into, in essence, a single motivation. It would be strange in the future moment to say that we violate our earlier motivation when we no longer wish to fulfill our commitment. This is the central problem of bald commitments into the future: we cannot tie our future and present motivations together to yield a single “net” motivation for action. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 205

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to Hardin’s central claim (cited in reading purpose) that trust requires observable constraints on opportunistic behavior — this is the mechanism by which unobservable, time-separated motives defeat trustworthiness. — connects to: Trust reduces future complexity by committing to a determinate future — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 138; Public commitment makes future fulfillment costly to renege on by invoking present social constraints; Mere incentive compatibility is insufficient for trust as encapsulated interest (+5 more)
• DEFINE: Defines ‘bald commitments into the future’ as commitments whose motivations cannot be coupled across time.
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 205

Broader Connections

• Trust reduces future complexity by committing to a determinate future #expands (0.82) — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 138
• Stating a reason creates a presumptive commitment to follow it later #contradicts (0.78) — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 325
• Public commitment makes future fulfillment costly to renege on by invoking present social constraints #qualifies (0.75)
• Mere incentive compatibility is insufficient for trust as encapsulated interest #complicates (0.72)
• Expressive orientations stabilize the present while instrumental ones defer to the future #corroborates (0.70)