Time preferences beyond uniform discount rates let players alter the game by delaying

Evidence

If we are to avoid adding a whole new dimension to our payoff matrix, in the form of discount rates, we must suppose that the game is terminated soon enough so that nothing like the interest rate enters the picture. We do not want to have to consider the time at which agreement is reached, in addition to the agreement itself. This is more than a matter of convenience; the game ceases to be “moveless,” except in very special cases, unless we make this stipulation. For, if the players’ time preferences take any shape except that of a continuously uniform discount rate, the game itself changes with the passage of time and a player can, in effect, change the game itself by failing to reach agreement. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 613

Categorization

• XREF: The ability to change the game by failing to agree is precisely the Corleone value in delay — leverage via patience — connecting to the reader’s hostage/credible-commitment analysis of asymmetric time horizons. — connects to: Patience can outlast an opponent’s brief advantage — , A Year of World Stories, 3392

Broader Connections

• Patience can outlast an opponent’s brief advantage #expands (0.85) — , A Year of World Stories, 3392