The universal soul is substance, not a single subject

Evidence

Nonetheless, Hegel does not return to the Aristotelian notion of a ‘world soul’: ‘The universal soul must not be fixed on that account as anima mundi, as if a single subject; it is rather the universal substance which has its actual truth only as individuality, subjectivity.’ — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 326

Categorization

• DEFINE: A precise distinction: universality as substance rather than anima mundi — the soul holds its truth only through the individual.
• XREF: connects to: Objects are constituted by reference to a plurality of consciousnesses, not a single subject; The soul becomes both substance and subject in Hegel’s analysis. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 359

Broader Connections

• The soul becomes both substance and subject in Hegel’s analysis. #contradicts (0.80) — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 359
• Objects are constituted by reference to a plurality of consciousnesses, not a single subject #corroborates (0.75)