The sovereign’s exposure of subjects’ lives becomes the basis for limiting its war power

Evidence

Kant sets the arbitrariness of a zoopolitical sovereignty in opposition to a principle of citizenship: the sovereign can declare war only if the citizens who will risk their lives in it have expressed their “free consent” in a republican vote. If the citizens can have a say at this point, it is not because they generally make the decisions, but specifically because in this decision it is their lives and the exposure of their living bodies to the danger of death or wounding that are involved. This introduces a very important aspect to the situation: a form of political subjectivity set in opposition to war-waging sovereignty, something that I shall call the citizenship of the living or the citizenship of exposable lives. In other words, they must have a say in the decision because they run the risk of dying in the situation the decision may produce. It is because war-waging sovereignty exposes the lives of its subjects—live citizens—that they acquire a measure of control over this power that can wound or kill them. It is because it can destroy us that we must have some power over it. — Grégoire Chamayou, A Theory of the Drone, 572 (#exemplifies, via linked claim)

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: Citizens gain political voice because their lives are exposed to war’s danger. — Grégoire Chamayou, A Theory of the Drone, 572; Sovereign power makes the subject’s very life and death depend on its will — Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 255

Broader Connections