The shari’a concept of virtue resists the modern law-morality divide.

Evidence

The concept of virtue ( fadi¯la) in the latter cannot be defined simply in terms of the type of sanction (this-worldly versus otherworldly) or of the type of governance (subjective freedom versus obedience to external authority). It constitutes a dimension of all accountable behavior (including justiciable acts), in the sense that while all such behavior is the responsibility of a free agent, it is also subject to assessments that have practical consequences for the way one lives in this world and the next. And all practical programs for the cultivation of moral virtues presuppose authoritative models. In the case of the shari¯‘a the ultimate model is that of the Prophet Muhammad as embodied in the discursive tradition known as hadi¯th. In other words, the shari¯‘a in this conception is the process whereby individuals are educated and educate themselves as moral subjects in a scheme that connects the obligation to act morally with the obligation to act legally in complicated ways. — Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular, 1164

Categorization

Category: Definitional Content

• DEFINE: Clarifies that ‘virtue’ (fadila) in premodern shari’a was a dimension of all accountable behavior, not a separate sphere from law.
• XREF: Connects to the reader’s interest in how secular modernity redraws the boundaries of religion, law, and ethics—parallels the Sharia/state discussions elsewhere.

Related

• In traditional sharia, virtue spans all accountable behavior, not just nonsanctioned areas (similarity 0.95)
• Sharia’s own distinction between law and ethics predates the secular split (similarity 0.81)