The right to privacy shifted from protecting marriage to protecting individual choice

Evidence

Although the Court in Eisenstadt based its decision on the right to privacy, the quotation indicates that the Court’s definition of the right—what Levi refers to as the rule or legal standard—had changed. No longer did the Court view the right to privacy as rooted in certain legally sanctioned relationships, such as marriage (the position it had taken in Griswold). Instead, it argued that the right to privacy belonged to the individual. In addition, the Court expanded the right from a safeguard against unreasonable invasions of the marital bedroom into a right to choose whether to procreate. — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1272

Categorization

• XREF: This is the concrete doctrinal march (Griswold to Eisenstadt to Roe) that the earlier Bowers-vs-Lawrence chapter passage treated abstractly. — connects to: Privacy rights protect individual autonomy over procreation regardless of marital status — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1271; Roe extended the privacy right to abortion as an elaboration of Eisenstadt. — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1275; Private reason means entitlement to difference rather than physical privacy — Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular:…, 43

Broader Connections

• Private reason means entitlement to difference rather than physical privacy #expands (0.72) — Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular, 43