The plain-meaning rule forced lawyers into dual-level arguments about statutory meaning.
Evidence
The effect of the rule was to introduce an artificial and curious dualism into arguments and opinions on issues of statutory interpretation. On the first level of argument the question was whether, disregarding the challenged aids, the meaning was “plain.” For the court the case might end here. But counsel had always to anticipate the possibility that the words alone might seem to the court ambiguous. This called for an argument in the alternative as to the meaning of the statute if account were taken of the aids. — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 1988
Categorization
- XREF: connects to: American courts never formally barred legislative history, only weighed it case by case. — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 1971; Courts decide statutory meaning where legislative intent is genuinely ambiguous — Lawrence M. Friedman and Grant M. Hayden, American Law: An Introduction, 490; Common-law judging habits now shape statutory interpretation too. — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 117 (+5 more)
Broader Connections
- Legislative intent and statutory purpose are conceptually distinct and often conflated
#corroborates(0.80) — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 293 - Literal statutory interpretations are defeasible starting points
#corroborates(0.78) — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 303 - Statutory interpretation problems usually involve vagueness, not ambiguity
#qualifies(0.75) — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 689 - Statutory language is a social institution constraining what words can mean
#expands(0.75) — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 3510 - Courts decide statutory meaning where legislative intent is genuinely ambiguous
#qualifies(0.72) — Lawrence M. Friedman and Grant M. Hayden, American Law, 490 - Common-law judging habits now shape statutory interpretation too.
#qualifies(0.70) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 117