The Other’s freedom is the sole separation between my self and the Other

Evidence

Thus through the look I experience the Other concretely as a free, conscious subject who causes there to be a world by temporalizing himself toward his own possibilities. That subject’s presence without intermediary is the necessary condition of all thought which I would attempt to form concerning myself. The Other is that “myself” from which nothing separates me, absolutely nothing except his pure and total freedom: that is, that indetermination of himself which he has to be for and through himself. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 749

Categorization

  • DEFINE: Defines the Other’s freedom as pure indetermination, and frames it as the only thing separating self and Other.
  • XREF: connects to: Shame claims the Other’s freedom as one’s own, affirming a unity of being.; Others’ freedom is the condition of, not a limit on, my own freedom — Simone de Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity, 91; I can neither direct nor escape the Other’s freedom. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 1010 (+2 more)

Broader Connections