The Other’s freedom is the sole separation between my self and the Other
Evidence
Thus through the look I experience the Other concretely as a free, conscious subject who causes there to be a world by temporalizing himself toward his own possibilities. That subject’s presence without intermediary is the necessary condition of all thought which I would attempt to form concerning myself. The Other is that “myself” from which nothing separates me, absolutely nothing except his pure and total freedom: that is, that indetermination of himself which he has to be for and through himself. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 749
Categorization
- DEFINE: Defines the Other’s freedom as pure indetermination, and frames it as the only thing separating self and Other.
- XREF: connects to: Shame claims the Other’s freedom as one’s own, affirming a unity of being.; Others’ freedom is the condition of, not a limit on, my own freedom — Simone de Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity, 91; I can neither direct nor escape the Other’s freedom. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 1010 (+2 more)
Broader Connections
- Others’ freedom is the condition of, not a limit on, my own freedom
#expands(0.92) — Simone de Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity, 91 - I can neither direct nor escape the Other’s freedom.
#expands(0.85) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1010 - Individual freedom is achieved only through the freedom of others
#corroborates(0.85) — Simone de Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity, 144 - Other people open or close the future that my freedom requires
#expands(0.80) — Simone de Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity, 86