The other’s body is originally given as being-in-situation

Evidence

We must note in addition that this appearance of the body does not give us the body as it acts and perceives but only as it is acted on and perceived. In short, as we remarked at the beginning of this chapter, it would be possible to conceive of a system of visual organs such that it would allow one eye to see the other. But the seen eye would be seen as a thing, not as a being of reference. Similarly the hand which I grasp with my other hand is not apprehended as a hand which is grasping but as an apprehensible object. Thus the nature of our body for us entirely escapes us to the extent that we can take upon it the Other’s point of view. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 923 (#expands, via linked claim)

In his first example, Sartre asks us to imagine walking in a park. If I’m alone, the park arranges itself comfortably around my point of view: everything I see presents itself to me. But then I notice a man crossing the lawn towards me. This causes a sudden cosmic shift. I become conscious that the man is also arranging his own universe around himself. As Sartre puts it, the green of the grass turns itself towards the other man as well as towards me, and some of my universe drains off in his direction. Some of me drains off too, for I am an object in his world as he is in mine. I am no longer a pure perceiving nothingness; I have a visible outside, which I know he can see. — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café, 676 (#qualifies, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: The body is primarily known as the Other’s body, not one’s own; The Other’s body is given as his facticity regardless of presence or absence. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 894; Body-for-others is studied through the identity of my-being-for-the-Other structures (+4 more)

Broader Connections

• The body seen from another’s viewpoint is a thing, not lived #expands (0.85) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 923
• Body-for-others is studied through the identity of my-being-for-the-Other structures #expands (0.80)
• The situation is constituted from Others’ meanings rather than from being itself #contradicts (0.75) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 444
• Encountering another person makes one an object in their world #qualifies (0.75) — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café, 676