The modern concept of responsibility is foreign to Greek tragic agency.

Evidence

Michael Dillon, whose impressive analysis of disempowerment has led me to write this section, observes that by finally “taking responsibility” for himself, Oedipus becomes an agent in his own right. His is a suggestive interpretation, but I am not persuaded that the notion of “responsibility” is appropriate here. If we take that notion as containing the elements of imputability and liability to punishment it seems to me that Oedipus is not responsible to any authority. He does not have to answer to any court (human or divine) for his actions—not even to what Christian casuistry would later call “the internal court of conscience,” a concept quite foreign to the Greeks. — Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular, 452

Categorization

• DEFINE: Asad roots the inward ‘court of conscience’ specifically in Christian casuistry, marking it as a historical religious formation rather than a universal category.
• XREF: Directly feeds the Cooper bridge: the Christian-casuistry genealogy of conscience supports the claim that putatively secular moral categories are Christian formations.