The law rarely dictates outcomes, so judges’ political views decide most cases.

Evidence

According to the political perspective, these disagreements cannot be attributed to legal factors. When a multimember court decides a case, all the judges are construing the same enactments, interpreting the same precedents, and applying the same law to the same set of facts. Thus, differences in the law or in the facts cannot explain differences in judgment. … Differences in judgment occur, according to the political perspective, because the law does not really determine the outcome of most cases. Rarely is the law so clear and definite that only a single position is legally defensible. Rather, in most cases, the plaintiff and the defendant can each make a substantial legal argument for ruling in their favor. This is particularly likely when, as is true for the U.S. Supreme Court and many state supreme courts, the justices have discretion to exclude legally unambiguous cases from their docket. In such circumstances, judges must choose among possible outcomes, and their choices reflect the judges’ personal political views. The judges’ views, then, and not the law, ultimately determine how cases are resolved. — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1283

Categorization

  • XREF: Extends ch50’s claim that novel/competing-rule cases escape deductive reasoning, and ch47’s vote-prediction-from-attitudes theme. — connects to: Judges create law when forced to resolve statutory ambiguity. — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 187; Judicial decisions result from attitudes, role conceptions, and institutional constraints interacting together. — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1286; Judges expand or narrow precedent by reasoning analogically, not mechanically. — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1278 (+13 more)

Broader Connections