The inseparability of freedom and power undercuts Sartre’s claim that slaves are free

Evidence

Moreover, if puissance is integral to the realization of liberté and if, as Beauvoir here begins to suggest, the two are not in actuality separable in lived experience, then it is no longer straightforwardly the case, as Sartre had claimed, that “the slave in chains is as free as his master” (BN, 550; I am using the 1956 Philosophical Library edition). — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 501

Categorization

  • XREF: Directly contrasts Beauvoir’s notion of effective freedom (puissance) with Sartre’s controversial BN remark that ‘the slave in chains is as free as his master’ — a core node in the authorship/influence debate this book is built around. — connects to: Sartre argues existential freedom survives even imprisonment and death — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café: Freedom,…, 509; Sartre defined slavery as dependence on another’s freedom that grounds one’s own being — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 172; Sartre’s freedom is structurally immune to genuine removal by the Other. — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 641 (+1 more)
  • DEFINE: Defines puissance as ‘power’ in the enablement sense — capacity to be effective — and distinguishes it from the ontological freedom Beauvoir criticizes in Sartre.

Broader Connections