The fault principle shielded industry from full liability to spare capital

Evidence

Tort law depended on the fault principle. A railroad, or other company, that did harm to a person was liable only if it violated this principle, on the basis of the vague, subtle standard of the “reasonable man.” Fault meant a breach of duty to the public, meant that the defendant had not done what a reasonable person should do. Absolute liability was rejected; more accurately, it was never considered. Absolute liability would have meant simply this: you caused an injury to John or Mary, therefore you will pay. But such a rule would have been, in context, far too dangerous. If railroads, and enterprise generally, had to pay for all damage done “by accident,” they perhaps would not have thrived. Ordinary caution became the standard. The judges worked to limit damages to some moderate measure. Capital had to be spared for its necessary work. — Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law, 2686

Categorization

• XREF: Directly parallels ch44’s pro-enterprise tort rules debate — Friedman revisits and deepens that theme here. — connects to: Industrial calamities forced the creation of genuinely new tort law — Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law, 1783
• SEED: The fault principle as a deliberate subsidy to capital formation is an angle tying environmental liability, worker injury, and climate damages together.