The F.L.N.’s eight-day general strike was broken within forty-eight hours

Evidence

On the first day of the strike the postal and telegraph service reported seventy-one per cent of its Muslim personnel absent in the Algiers area, forty-one per cent in Oran and only twenty-eight per cent in Constantine; on the railways there was an almost total walkout in Algiers, fifty per cent in Oran and twenty-five per cent in Constantine. The next day, the figures had dwindled substantially and forty-eight hours after the beginning of the strike it had been effectively broken. In the opinion of Colonel Godard, Ben M’hidi had committed a cardinal error in endeavouring to keep the strike going so long; a short strike would have been hard to break, but eight days made it much more vulnerable. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 573 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Ramdane Abane crossed the ts by explaining that: “Even if we take risks, our struggle must become known. We could kill hundreds of colonialist soldiers without this ever being publicly announced.” The F.L.N. leaders felt that the combination of Yacef’s grip of terror on Algiers and the F.L.N.’s acquired influence among the trade unions as a whole — in the shape of the recently-formed U.G.T.A. (Union Général des Travailleurs Algériens) — made them strong enough to accept the risks involved, and over so prolonged a period as eight days. In fact, it was to turn out to be perhaps the F.L.N.’s gravest tactical error of the entire war. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 571 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: The strike collapsed within forty-eight hours due to its excessive length. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 573; The eight-day strike proved the FLN’s gravest tactical error of the war. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 571

Broader Connections